IEC 62443 IT and OT teams

Design IEC 62443 zones and conduits

By Aldo Campi, co-founder and CEO of Stoorm5 · White paper published 31 October 2024

Download the white paper (PDF, 14 pages)Draw your zones with an expert

What are zones and conduits in IEC 62443?

A security zone is a logical or physical area of an industrial control system that groups assets with the same security needs, under its own rules. A conduit is the communication path between two zones, physical or virtual, protected by its own measures. Together they limit how far an attack can spread, so a compromised zone stops one part of the process, not the plant.

See the zones of one production line

One line, its local PC and the four zones it talks to, inside two larger layers.

IEC 62443 zones and conduits around one production lineZone Plant contains zone Production lines and the zones Application server and SCADA. Zone Production lines contains zone Line 1 (the line and its local PC), zone Line 2 and zone Maintenance. Zone IT service sits outside the plant. Conduits connect zone Line 1 to Maintenance, Application server, SCADA and IT service. Traffic between Line 1 and Line 2 is blocked.ZONE PLANTZONE PRODUCTION LINESZONE LINE 1Line 1Local PCZONE LINE 2Line 2ZONE MAINTENANCERemote VPNRDP, SSH, HTTPZONE APP SERVERPrinter, folderNTPfrom Line 1 only theseZONE SCADAOPC UA, ICMPfrom Line 1 only theseZONE IT SERVICEDNS, HTTPfrom Line 1 only theseSecurity zoneConduit: only the listed trafficEast-West: blocked
The worked example of the white paper. Inside a zone, traffic is free. Between zones, a conduit carries only the traffic in the table below.

North-South traffic Field to central services: control. East-West traffic Device to device: block or control

  • North-South goes between the field and central or external services. Control it with perimeter firewalls, DMZs, VPNs and role-based access.
  • East-West goes between devices at the same level, often inside one VLAN. Attackers use it to move sideways and raise their privileges.

Create the zones in seven steps

  1. Identify the critical resourcesMachines, automation systems, databases, servers and the processes that depend on them.
  2. Analyse the riskThreats and vulnerabilities that can hit those resources, with their impact and likelihood.
  3. Define the zonesSplit the network into logical or physical zones by function, criticality and sensitivity.
  4. Write the policiesAccess control, credential management and monitoring rules for each zone.
  5. Put the measures in placeFirewalls, intrusion detection, access controls and segmentation rules on the switches.
  6. Test and validateCheck that every measure works and that critical resources are protected.
  7. Monitor and maintainKeep the zones in line with changes in the plant and with new threats.

Protect the critical processes and assets first. The rest can share zones without specific protection, as long as a compromise there does not touch operational continuity or operator safety.

Read the traffic matrix of Line 1

Inside ZONE LINE 1 the line and its local PC talk freely. Everything that leaves the zone needs a row in the matrix. Anything else is blocked.

FromToAllowed traffic
ZONE LINE 1ZONE MAINTENANCERemote VPNRDP, SSH, HTTP
ZONE LINE 1ZONE APPLICATION SERVEROT servicePrinter, shared folder, NTP
ZONE LINE 1ZONE SCADARemote SCADAOPC UA, ICMP
ZONE LINE 1ZONE IT SERVICEIT serviceDNS, HTTP

Source: the white paper, table 1. A matrix between zones is much shorter than a matrix between devices.

Add layers, then open them when production needs it

The white paper wraps the zones in two layers: ZONE PRODUCTION LINES (the lines and their local services) and ZONE PLANT (the lines and all OT services). Each inner zone can then be switched off on purpose, while the outer layer keeps protecting.

Example 1

Let all lines talk and allow remote maintenance

Switch off ZONE LINE 1, ZONE LINE 2 and ZONE MAINTENANCE. Traffic inside ZONE PRODUCTION LINES is free. External traffic stays protected.

Example 2

Let all field devices talk

Switch off every OT zone. The plant communicates freely. External protection stays on.

In Edge SDN each of these is a profile. IT designs it in advance. OT switches it on from a tablet and off again with one tap, with a log of who did it and when. See the profiles

Avoid five common mistakes

  • Grouping assets by type instead of by process, for example all the PLCs of one vendor in one zone.
  • Leaving IT assets inside OT zones, such as an office PC on the corporate domain next to a production line.
  • Drawing zones only around today's vulnerabilities. The result is fine-grained, hard to maintain and changes with every scan.
  • Leaving boundaries vague, so policies overlap or parts of the process sit in no zone at all.

Read the full white paper

The 14 pages add the reference architecture, best practice for grouping assets and the layered "onion" model. Part 3-2 of the ISA/IEC 62443 series is the reference for partitioning a system into zones and conduits.

Download the white paper (PDF)

From the drawing to the network

Choose where the zones run

The same design works for a whole plant or for one machine.

The Edge SDN console on a monitor: switches, hosts, deployed profiles and the security level of two zones over time.I run a plant

Edge SDN

Zones and conduits for the whole plant, enforced on the switches you have. Profiles for production, maintenance and backup. Reports for IEC 62443 and NIS2 audits.

The Edge Shield models together: compact DIN-rail units, a fanless switch, a desktop switch and a 1U rack unit with a display.I build machines

Edge Shield

Zones and conduits for a single machine. A smart switch at the machine boundary, a target Security Level for each profile and an intrusion detection system inside.

Already shipped machines? Shield Lifecycle shows which ones a new CVE exposes.

Frequently asked questions

Is a VLAN a security zone?

No. A VLAN or an IP subnet is a way to address the network. A security zone groups assets by production process and security need, and one process can span several VLANs.

How many security zones should a plant have?

As few as the risk analysis needs. Each zone should be one element of the production process, so that a compromised zone stops only that element. Too many layers and details make the design hard to run.

Where should Wi-Fi and Bluetooth go?

In a zone of their own. Radio links are always exposed, so the white paper recommends isolating them.

What is the difference between North-South and East-West traffic?

North-South traffic goes between the field and central or external services; it must be controlled. East-West traffic goes between devices at the same level, often inside one VLAN; it must be blocked or controlled, because attackers use it to move sideways.

Do I need new switches to enforce zones and conduits?

Not always. Zones can run as segmentation rules on the switches a plant already has. Edge SDN does this on Cisco, Aruba, HPE and Allied Telesis switches and on switches compatible with OpenFlow 1.3, with no IP, VLAN or firewall change.

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Bring the list of lines and machines. In a first call we sketch the zones, the conduits between them and what the switches you have can enforce.